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A Revelation Principle
This section formulates the model as a game between the individuals and the govern-
ment, and establishes that the no-reform constraint is satisfied in the government’s opti-
mal equilibrium if H (0) ≥ α and either of the following two conditions holds:
1. The reform threat is full equalization: cR2 (θ) = RK for all θ.
2. H is the step function H (x) = I {x ≥ 0} and the government is uncertain as to the
reform threat and evaluates policies using a maxmin criterion over reform threats,
where the set of possible reform threats contains only progressive reforms and con-
tains full equalization.
Individuals’ and the government’s preferences are as in the text. The game will in-
volve tax schedules
(
Ty, Tk
)
, which importantly are required to satisfy the resource con-
straint whatever production decisions individuals make. Formally, let H be the set of
probability distributions onR+, corresponding to possible distributions of output or cap-
ital. A labor tax schedule Ty is a map from R+ ×H →R such that
∫
y∈R+ Ty (y, H) dH ≥
0 for all H ∈ H. A capital tax schedule Tk is a map from R+ × H →R such that∫
k∈R+ Tk (Rk, H) dH ≥ 0 for all H ∈ H. A reform threat TR2 is now a mapping from
status quo capital tax schedules Tk to reform capital tax schedules TRk . The game is as
follows:
∗Email addresses: scheuer@stanford.edu, wolitzky@mit.edu.
Period 1:
1. Taking as given an exogenous reform threat TR2 , the government proposes a tax
schedule
(
Ty, Tk
)
. The labor tax schedule Ty is implemented (see below), and the
period 2 status quo capital tax schedule is set to Tk.
2. Individuals produce, pay labor taxes, and consume in period 1, as follows:
(a) Individuals simultaneously choose production y.
(b) Given the resulting distribution of output Hy, an individual who produced y
pays labor tax Ty (y, Hy).
(c) An individual with after-tax income y− Ty (y, Hy) chooses period 1 consump-
tion c1 ∈
[
0, y− Ty (y, Hy)
]
. This leaves her with capital k = y− Ty (y, Hy)−
c1 ≥ 0. Denote the resulting distribution of capital by Hk.
Period 2:
1. The reform threat TR2 combined with the status quo capital tax schedule Tk generate
a reform capital tax schedule TRk . Individuals decide whether to support the period
2 status quo capital tax schedule Tk or the reform capital tax schedule TRk .
2. If at least α individuals support the status quo, then the capital tax schedule Tk is im-
plemented, meaning that an individual with capital k consumes Rk− Tk
(
Rk, Hk
)
. If
fewer than α individuals support the status quo, then the reform capital tax sched-
ule TRk is implemented, meaning that an individual with capital k consumes Rk −
TRk
(
Rk, Hk
)
.
A (symmetric, pure strategy, subgame perfect) equilibrium consists of a proposed tax
schedule
(
Ty, Tk
)
, and production, consumption, and political support strategies Y : Ty ×
Tk ×Θ → y, C : Ty × Tk ×Θ → c1, S : Tk ×R+ → {0, 1} (where Ty and Tk are the sets of
possible tax schedules Ty and Tk, and S is a political support strategy), such that:
1.
(
Ty, Tk
)
maximizes the government’s payoff given (Y, C, S).
2. (Y, C) maximizes the utility of each type θ given
(
Ty, Tk
)
and given that other indi-
viduals follow (Y, C, S).
3. S is “sincere,” in that a type θ individual supports the period 2 status quo if and
only if cSQ2 (θ) + ε
SQ ≥ cR2 (θ) + εR.
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4. C
(
Ty, Tk, θ
) ≤ Y (Ty, Tk, θ) − Ty (Y (Ty, Tk, θ) , HY(Ty,Tk,·)) for all Ty ∈ Ty, Tk ∈
Tk, θ ∈ Θ (i.e., individuals do not consume more than their after-tax incomes in
period 1).
An allocation (c1 : Θ→ R+, c2 : Θ→ R+, y : Θ→ R+) is a mapping from types to pe-
riod 1 consumption, period 2 consumption, and production. An allocation is feasible if it
satisfies the intertemporal resource constraint
∫
(c1 (θ) + c2 (θ) /R) dF ≤
∫
y (θ) dF. An
allocation is implementable if there exists an equilibrium
(
Ty, Tk, Y, C, S
)
such that Y(Ty, Tk,
θ) = y (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, C (Ty, Tk, θ) = c1 (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, and D (Ty, Tk, Y, C, θ) = c2 (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ,
where D
(
Ty, Tk, Y, C, θ
)
is the period 2 consumption of a type θ individual in equilibrium(
Ty, Tk, Y, C, S
)
.
In the text, attention is restricted to feasible, incentive-compatible direct mechanisms
that satisfy the no-reform constraint
∫
H (c2 (θ) , RK) dF ≥ α. With fully equalizing re-
forms, this approach is justified by the following result.1
Proposition 1 (Revelation Principle). With fully equalizing reforms, if Assumption 1 holds
then every implementable allocation is feasible, incentive-compatible, and satisfies the no-reform
constraint (NR”).
Proof. Showing that any implementable allocation is feasible is a simple accounting ex-
ercise. Any implementable allocation is incentive-compatible as a direct mechanism, by
the usual revelation principle argument (whether or not it is implemented in an equilib-
rium in which a reform occurs): a unilateral deviation does not affect the implemented
tax schedules or the resulting distributions Gy or Gk, so if y (θ) and c1 (θ) are the opti-
mal production and period 1 consumption choices of a type θ individual given others’
behavior, then in particular she prefers (c1 (θ) , c2 (θ) , y (θ)) to (c1 (θ′) , c2 (θ′) , y (θ′)) for
all θ′ ∈ Θ. Thus, it suffices to show that every implementable allocation satisfies the
no-reform constraint (NR”) when viewed as a direct mechanism.
To see this, note that if an allocation is implemented in an equilibrium in which no
period 2 reform occurs, then it satisfies the no-reform constraint when viewed as a direct
mechanism, as the condition for no period 2 reform to occur in equilibrium is precisely
the no-reform constraint for the corresponding direct mechanism. In addition, if an allo-
cation (c1, c2, y) is implemented in an equilibrium in which a period 2 reform does occur,
then c is constant. In this case, Assumption 1 implies that (c1, c2, y) satisfies the no-reform
constraint when viewed as a direct mechanism.
1The converse also holds for monotone allocations, as shown in Section C.2.
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With more general reforms, it is no longer true that every implementable allocation
satisfies the no-reform constraint, as discussed in Section II.D of the paper. However,
suppose now that there is a set of possible reform threats T Rk , and that the government
must propose a tax schedule
(
Ty, Tk
)
without knowing which reform threat will arise.2
We say that a tax schedule
(
Ty, Tk
)
robustly attains value V if, for every reform threat TR2 ∈
T Rk , when the government proposes tax schedule
(
T∗y , T∗k
)
and reform threat TR2 realizes,
there exists a continuation equilibrium in which
∫
v (θ) dG ≥ V. Let V∗ be the supremum
over values V that can be robustly attained by any tax schedule. Finally, say that a tax
schedule
(
T∗y , T∗k
)
is maxmin optimal if it robustly attains value V∗.
Furthermore, assume that T Rk contains only progressive reforms and contains full
equalization. We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (Maxmin Optimality). If H is the step function H (x) = I {x ≥ 0} then there
exists a maxmin optimal tax schedule and a continuation equilibrium (independent of the realized
reform threat TR2 ) such that the resulting allocation is feasible, incentive-compatible, and satisfies
the no-reform constraint (NR’).
Proof. Let (c∗1 , c
∗
2 , y
∗) denote a solution to the government’s problem (which exists by
Lemma 2), and let V∗∗ denote the corresponding value. By Proposition 1 (which applies
as Assumption 1 is always satisfied when H is the step function), when the reform threat
is known to be full equalization, the value of
∫
v (θ) dG in any equilibrium is at most V∗∗.
Hence, V∗ ≤ V∗∗. In addition, again by Proposition 1, when the reform threat is known
to be full equalization, there exists an optimal tax schedule
(
T∗y , T∗k
)
and a continuation
equilibrium that leads to allocation (c∗1 , c
∗
2 , y
∗) and is feasible, incentive-compatible, and
satisfies (NR’). As the condition for a reform to occur is the same under any progressive
reform when H is the step function, if the government announces tax schedule
(
T∗y , T∗k
)
then this continuation strategy profile remains an equilibrium for any realized reform
threat TR2 ∈ T Rk . In particular, this equilibrium yields value V∗∗ for every reform threat
TR2 ∈ T Rk , which by the definition of V∗ implies that V∗ ≥ V∗∗. Hence, V∗ = V∗∗, and
the tax schedule
(
T∗y , T∗k
)
is maxmin optimal.
B Monotone Solution to the Government’s Problem
The following inequality is due to Lorentz (1953).3
2In contrast, we assume that citizens learn the reform threat after the government proposes a tax sched-
ule but before they make their period 1 production and consumption decisions.
3Lorentz assumed that µ is Lebesgue measure, but the generalization to arbitrary non-atomic measures
is straightforward. See Burchard and Hajaiej (2006) for further generalizations and discussion.
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Lemma 1. Let µ be a non-atomic measure on a set Θ ⊆ R, let a and b be measurable functions
from Θ to R+, and let w : R2+ → R be continuous with increasing differences. Then∫
Θ
w (a (θ) , b (θ)) dµ ≤
∫
Θ
w
(
a¯ (θ) , b¯ (θ)
)
dµ,
where a¯ and b¯ are the non-decreasing rearrangements of a and b, defined by
a¯ (θ) = inf
{
a0 ∈ R+ : µ
({
θ′ : a
(
θ′
) ≤ a0}) > µ ((−∞, θ])} ,
b¯ (θ) = inf
{
b0 ∈ R+ : µ
({
θ′ : b
(
θ′
) ≤ b0}) > µ ((−∞, θ])} .
We use Lemma 1 to establish the existence of a monotone solution to the government’s
problem.
Lemma 2. There exists a solution to the government’s problem in which c2 (θ) is non-decreasing.
Proof. Recall that the government’s problem is maxc1,c2,y
∫
v(θ)dG subject to (RC), (IC),
and (NR’). That some solution (c∗1 , c
∗
2 , y
∗) to this problem exists follows because the objec-
tive is continuous and the constraint set is closed and can be bounded using the Inada
conditions on u.4 Given such a solution, let U∗ (θ) = u (c∗1 (θ)) + βu (c
∗
2 (θ)), let c¯
∗
2 be the
non-decreasing rearrangement of c∗2 , and consider the allocation given by
(c˜1 (θ) , c˜2 (θ) , y∗ (θ)) =
(
u−1 (U∗ (θ)− βu (c¯∗2 (θ))) , c¯∗2 (θ) , y∗ (θ)
)
for all θ.
This alternative allocation leaves consumption utility U (θ) and production y (θ) unchanged
for every type, and therefore yields the same value as (c∗1 , c
∗
2 , y
∗) and satisfies (IC). As c¯∗2
and c∗2 are equimeasurable, it also satisfies (NR’). Finally, note that∫ (
u−1 (U (θ)− βu (c2 (θ))) + 1R c2 (θ)
)
dF
has decreasing differences in θ and c2 for any non-decreasing U (θ), as u is concave. As
4This follows by standard arguments if the Pareto weights are bounded away from zero. With zero
Pareto weights, one might worry that the government would want to give unboundedly negative utility
to some types. However, the Inada conditions imply an upper bound on y (θ) for the government’s most-
favored type θ, and (IC) then implies that the utility of any type θ′ can be lower than type θ’s utility by at
most h (y (θ) , θ′)− h (y (θ) , θ), a bounded number.
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U∗ is non-decreasing by (IC), Lemma 1 implies that
∫ (
c∗1 (θ) +
1
R
c∗2 (θ)
)
dF =
∫ (
u−1 (U∗ (θ)− βu (c∗2 (θ))) +
1
R
c∗2 (θ)
)
dF
≥
∫ (
u−1 (U¯∗ (θ)− βu (c¯∗2 (θ))) +
1
R
c¯∗2 (θ)
)
dF
=
∫ (
u−1 (U∗ (θ)− βu (c¯∗2 (θ))) +
1
R
c¯∗2 (θ)
)
dF
=
∫ (
c˜1 (θ) +
1
R
c˜2 (θ)
)
dF,
where U¯∗ is the non-decreasing rearrangement of U∗, which equals U∗ almost every-
where as U∗ is non-decreasing. Thus, the alternative allocation (c˜1 (θ) , c˜2 (θ) , y∗ (θ)) also
satisfies (RC), and it therefore constitutes a monotone solution to the government’s prob-
lem.
C Calibration and Tax Implementation
This appendix describes the calibration underlying the numerical results in Section IV of
the paper and relates the capital and labor wedges to marginal tax rates in an explicit tax
implementation.
C.1 Calibration
We consider iso-elastic preferences of the form u(c) = c1−σ/(1− σ) and h(l) = γl1+1/ε/
(1+ 1/ε) where l = y/θ, so the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is constant and given by
ε. We set ε = 1, consistent with evidence in Kimball and Shapiro (2010) and Erosa, Fuster
and Kambourov (2011). We interpret a model period as T = 30 years and accordingly set
β = 0.9530 and R = 1/β (so the optimum under full commitment involves consumption
smoothing with c1(θ) = c2(θ)). For the skill distribution F, we follow Mankiw, Weinzierl
and Yagan (2009), who fit a lognormal distribution to the empirical wage distribution
from the 2007 Current Population Survey and append a Pareto distribution for the upper
tail of wages to obtain asymptotic marginal tax rates as in Saez (2001). We extend their
numerical procedure for a static Mirrlees model to our dynamic setting in order to com-
pute both τl(θ) and τk(θ) and follow them in setting σ = 1.5 and γ = 2.55. We assume
that the distribution of taste shocks H is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 1
(corresponding to just over 10% of mean utility).
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C.2 Tax Implementation
Our analysis in the main text has implicitly considered direct mechanisms, where the
government allocates c1(θ), c2(θ), and y(θ) conditional on individual reports about θ,
taking into account technological, incentive compatibility, and political sustainability con-
straints. It is straightforward to show that these allocations can alternatively—and more
realistically—be implemented through a tax system where each individual is confronted
with the same budget set and picks her preferred allocation within this set. In particular,
with a non-linear labor income tax Ty and a non-linear capital income tax Tk, individuals
are faced with the budget constraint c1 + k ≤ y− Ty(y) in period 1 and c2 ≤ Rk− Tk(Rk)
in period 2 and choose c1, c2, y, k to maximize u(c1) + βu(c2)− h(y, θ) subject to these two
constraints.
By Proposition 3 of Farhi et al. (2012), any incentive compatible allocation (c1(θ), c2(θ),
y(θ)) that is non-decreasing in θ can be implemented using such a tax system. Since we
show that c2(θ) is non-decreasing in an optimal allocation and y(θ) is non-decreasing
by incentive compatibility, their result can be applied to our framework.5 Moreover, the
first-order conditions from the above utility-maximization problem imply
u′(c1(θ)) = βR(1− T′k(Rk(θ)))u′(c2(θ))
for all θ whenever Tk is differentiable, so the wedge τk(θ) defined in equation (1) of the
paper and characterized throughout this paper coincides with the actual marginal capital
income tax rate T′k(Rk(θ)) faced by individuals of type θ in this implementation.
6
D Extensions
This appendix briefly presents two extensions of the model that serve as robustness checks
on our results. Section D.1 considers a setting where the full commitment benchmark in-
volves non-zero capital taxes. Section D.2 extends our two-period model to overlapping
generations.
5The statement of Proposition 3 in Farhi et al. (2012) also requires c1(θ) to be non-decreasing, which
holds at the optimum in their model but may or may not hold in ours. However, inspecting their proof
reveals that this condition is not actually needed for the result.
6If Tk(Rk(θ)) is not differentiable because there is pooling at consumption level c2(θ) (so Tk has a convex
kink), τk(θ) is still bounded between the (well-defined) left- and right-derivatives of Tk.
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D.1 Heterogeneity in Savings Propensity
We have derived our results in a dynamic Mirrlees model where, in the absence of po-
litical constraints, optimal capital taxes are zero. It is natural to ask whether and how
they extend to settings where the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not apply to the full
commitment benchmark. For example, this is the case when individuals differ in their
propensity to save rather than their ability, as emphasized recently by Farhi and Werning
(2013) and Piketty and Saez (2013). We briefly demonstrate that, in this case, our results
extend in the sense that the pattern of capital taxes found in Section III.A of the paper can
be interpreted as the optimal addition to the full commitment capital tax benchmark.
To this purpose, we consider a modification of our basic two-period model without
labor supply, where individuals simply consume in both periods and all start out with
the same initial wealth K1. Private heterogeneity enters exclusively in the form of savings
propensity, so that the wealthy individuals in period 2 will be those who are more patient.
Formally, preferences are u(c1) + βu(c2) and β is distributed according to F with support
contained in (0, 1). An allocation (c1(β), c2(β)) is resource feasible if∫
c1(β)dF + K2 ≤ RK1 and
∫
c2(θ)dF ≤ RK2 (1)
for some K2 ≥ 0 and is incentive compatible if
u(c1(β)) + βu(c2(β)) ≤ u(c1(β′)) + βu(c2(β′)) ∀β, β′. (2)
Considering the case with F = G for simplicity, the government solves in period 1
max
c1,c2, K2
∫
[u(c1(β)) + βu(c2(β))] dF
s.t. (1), (2), and
∫
H (u(c2(β))− u(RK2)) dF ≥ α. (3)
It is obvious that implicit capital taxes τk(β) (defined as in equation (1) of the paper) are no
longer necessarily zero even without the political constraint (3), because these wedges are
the only way to achieve redistribution across individuals with different savings propen-
sities β in period 1. However, the following useful decomposition of overall marginal
capital taxes in any solution without bunching can be established using standard steps:
τk(β)
1− τk(β) = χ(β)−
Rη
λ
[
H′(u(c2(β))− u(RK2))u′(c2(θ))− H¯K
]
, (4)
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where H¯K is defined as in equation (3) of the paper and
χ(β) =
Ru′(c2(β))
f (β)
∫ 1
β
(
1
u′(c1(β))
− 1
λ
)
dF
is the formula for the optimal τk/(1− τk) under full commitment, with
λ =
(∫ 1
0
1/u′(c1(β))dF
)−1
.
As can be seen from (4), exactly the same formula for the optimal marginal capital tax as
in Lemma 1 of the paper appears, with the only difference that it gets added to the (no
longer necessarily zero) benchmark marginal capital tax χ(β) that is present even in the
absence of political constraints.7 In this sense, our results extend in a transparent way to
situations where the Atkinson-Stiglitz conditions are not met under full commitment.
D.2 Overlapping Generations
There is also a straightforward extension of our two-period model to an infinite-horizon
overlapping generations (OLG) setting. In particular, consider the model from Section I
of the paper, except that a new generation is born in every period t = 1, 2, . . .. As before,
individuals live for two periods, produce only when young, and consume in both periods.
Each period begins with a capital stock RKt and a status quo consumption schedule for
the old c˜Ot . The timing in each period t is as follows:
1. Old individuals decide whether to support the status quo.
2. The government chooses a vector
(
yt, cYt , c˜
O
t+1
)
corresponding to production and
consumption for the period t young and status quo consumption for the period
t + 1 old, subject to the resource constraints∫
cYt (θt)dF + Kt+1 =
∫
yt(θt)dF and
∫
c˜Ot+1(θt)dF = RKt+1. (5)
If fewer than α old individuals support the status quo, a reform consumption sched-
ule cˆOt for the period t old is implemented, which must satisfy the resource con-
straint ∫
cˆOt (θt−1) dF ≤ RKt. (6)
7Of course, this interpretation of an additive adjustment to the capital tax under full commitment holds
only in terms of the formula (4), since both c1 and c2 change when we introduce political constraints.
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Otherwise, consumption for the period t old is given by the status quo c˜Ot .
The interpretation is that, in each period t, the government sets policies for the cur-
rently young generation, namely a labor income tax for the young in t and a capital tax
for when they will be old in t + 1, which will become the status quo for the next period.
If there is enough support among the currently old, it can also reform their status quo
capital tax (which was set in the preceding period) by redistributing their wealth. Note
that the resource constraints (5) and (6) rule out intergenerational transfers; we briefly
comment on this below.8
A Markov equilibrium of this model is one where individuals born in period t condition
their behavior when young (i.e., production and consumption) only on
(
yt, cYt
)
and Kt
and, when old, condition their support for the status quo only on c˜Ot+1 and Kt+1. All
of our results for the two-period model of the paper immediately extend to the Markov
equilibria of this OLG model.
The model is more complicated when intergenerational transfers and non-Markov
equilibria are allowed. In non-Markov equilibria, the government could be punished
for implementing a reform, or for setting particular allocations for the young, which pro-
vides an additional source of commitment power. Such history-dependence could also
arise with intergenerational transfers, as in this case the period t-young would also have
to condition their behavior on the status quo c˜Ot , which was set by the government in
period t− 1. In particular, it is not clear that a suitable definition of Markov equilibrium
exists in this case.
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